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EVALUATING GROWTH PROPOSALS
Professor Foster's invitation to this symposium
hinted pretty strongly that he would like me to say some-
thing trenchant about continued federal fiscal responsi-
bility, after the initial pump-priming, in a growth
centre strategy. At the time I quite happily agreed.
Later reflection, however, convinced me that this was not
one of the key questions for the Halifax region nor in
fact a very important one at all. What I propose to dis-
cuss instead is a structured way for a community to study
and debate its future. The twin assumptions, that the
future is malleable in important ways -- "ours to design"
-- and that its designers ought to be the present resi-
dents, are now part of the conventional planning wisdom.
Just how far they are (or ought to be) true, though, is
still a good question. Part of this paper has to do with
shortcomings in present ways in which communities now
study their futures, especially in the more analytic
methods propounded by fellow professionals, and with sug-
gestions for alternative. approaches. Along the way, and
in the blissful absence of real data, I shall mention as-
pects of some potential futures that may be disquieting
and maybe mildly provocative, and allude from time to time
to intergovernmental finance.
The heart of the argument. is that every alternative
proposal for this region's future ought to be examined for
its feasibility, its implications, and community valuations
of those implications; and that in addition to the
interests of the groups party to the decision, a prudent
community will sequentially evaluate a proposal in terms
of resilience, equity and (only then) efficiency. The or-
der is important. There is little sense in arguing about
the desireability of infeasible policies or unattainable
goals. Structuring the learning process in this fashion
allows many more options to be addressed with the same
resources of community time and energy.
Most of the rest of this paper is concerned with
explaining the italicized words above. Let me begin by
defining one of the many possible alternative futures of
the Halifax-Dartmouth metropolitan region as an exemplary
straw horse.
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Halifax as Growth Centre: Example of a Proposal
There has been advocacy for many years in favour of
making the Halifax urban region into a (or the) major
growth centre of the Maritimes. Of course, ever since the
famous Halifax Encounter, very different views of the pre-
ferred future have been part of the public debate. For
the sake of exposition, however, I shall elaborate the
growth centre alternative. This vague term usually in-
cludes at least three components. (1) Halifax should not
suffer outmigration. A minimal criterion for population
change is that it exceed the rate of natural increase;
more likely, the rate of population growth would approach
that of other large and prospering Canadian cities.
(2) Per capita incomes should rise even faster than
population, approaching or exceeding national norms in a
a decade or so. (3) In consequence, the Halifax-Dartmouth
metropolitan region should increase its present dominance
of its Maritime hinterland; and the region as a whole,
through the medium of a large and vigourous capital city,
should grow in influence and stature in the affairs of the
nation, while enjoying the benefits of the latest fashions
in technology and culture. Key to the implementation of
this glowing future is the concerted and deliberate mani-
pulation of policy instruments by the two senior levels
of government.
On the first criterion, population growth, natural
increase alone is unlikely to take the metro-area popula-
tion much above 300,000 in the remaining 25 years of this
century, especially if recent fertility declines persist.
Let us quite arbitrarily say, then, that a target popula-
tion of 340,000 by the 2001 Census would comfortably
satisfy the population goal.* Satisfying the second cri-
terion would imply the creation of about 35,000 new jobs
over that period, with a growth in real wage rates of
Series II
Series III
Series III
* This figure may be compared with the forecasts made for
the Lithwick Report, probably the best urban population
forecasting study yet done in Canada, but unfortunately
completed before 1971 Census results were reported, and
just before the dramatic continent-wide drop in fertility
became apparent. It is thus not surprising that only
one of their conditional forecasts falls below the num-
ber I have picked as indicating genuine growth:
Series I A 421,000
B 325,000
C 546,000
Pref 843,000
Pref 444,000
H 492,000
M 444,000
L 407,000
Source: Ｈ ｾ Ｉ Ｌ Tables 19, 23, and 24.
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something like six percent per year, on the average over
all jobs. In these parlous times, no one ventures to pre-
dict very confidently what the rest of the economy is
likely to do, but it is probably safe to say that a sus-
tained real income growth rate of six percent would be
sufficient to satisfy the relative wealth criterion.
Feasibility
How reasonable is such a scenario? One of the major
points I want to make is that the planning literature, as
well as planning practice, is woefully weak in useable ways
of answering that question; and in consequence, a lot of
energy is wasted in fruitless debates about unattainable
options. With respect to the growth trajectory suggested
by our hypothetical example, the first observation on feasi-
bility is that Halifax-Dartmouth is a component of much
larger systems. That excess of 40,000 immigrants over
emigrants has to come from somewhere, and it is convenient
to think of the possible origins as being the local hinter-
land, the rest of Canada, and the rest of the world.
In Canada as a whole, it is not overexaggerating to
say that the urbanization process has more or less ended,
in the sense that the great migrations from farm to city
have already taken place. There are no longer great
reservoirs of technologically underemployed labour in our
rural regions, though of course there remain puddles in
various places.* On the contrary, there are indications,
in the energetics of farming (16) and in the manifest pre-
ferences of urban Canadians for the tranquillity of rural
Maritime retreats, that the non-metropolitan population of
Nova Scotia, at least, may be approaching its all-time
historic low in the next decade or two. Time will tell,
but in any case, rural and small-town Maritimers will not
provide any important fraction of the incremental popula-
tion** -- especial.ly if the income target is maintained.
* By Census definition, Canada this year is about 80 percent
urban, while the Maritimes are only about 60 percent.
The difference corresponds to about 25 years of demo-
graphic history (17), though there are good reasons for
speculating that the Maritimes will never be as urbanized
as the rest of Canada -- and that Maritimers will be
the happier therefor.
** The point is emphasized by considering the nature of
urban growth by migration. Capturing a net gain of
40,000 means that the several hundred thousand persons
who will migrate to Halifax over these three decades
will exceed the almost-as-large number leaving by 40,000,
less the natural increase of the migrant population
while in Halifax. Migrants are highly volatile. (Cont'd)
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International migration is likewise unlikely to pro-
vide a major new source of Haligonians. As the Lithwick
Report Ｈ ｾ Ｉ showed, new Canadians are overwhelmingly likely
to lodge in the biggest cities. Indeed, one of the most
interesting implications of the studies organized by Lith-
wick in 1969-71 was that more than 60 percent of the growth
of Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver was likely to be accoun-
ted for, during 1971-2001, by international migrants and
their children, in the absence of policy changes. That
realization in turn spurred renewed Federal interest in
immigration policy, as evidenced by the current Green Paper.
Thus there are two factors mitigating against any large
number of new Canadians settling in Halifax: first, such
migrants are more likely to choose large (and perhaps
English-speaking 117» entrepot cities, and second, the ab-
solute number of immigrants may well decrease somewhat in
response to Federal policy initiatives predicated in part
on the strain such migrants impose on the already congested
big metropolitan regions.
The final source, and probably the only really major
one for Halifax, is the rest of urban Canada. For large
metropolitan areas in the coming post-industrial world,
the major sources of population change will be, for the first
time since the Industrial Revolution, locally generated
natural increase (most importantly) and migration from
other metropolitan regions. The goals of a growth centre
strategy for Halifax, then, must be consistent with the
dynamics of the rest of the Canadian urban system. If the
22 Census Metropolitan Areas with 1971 populations ｾ ｸ ｣ ･ ･ ､ ﾭ
ing 100,000 in 1971 be accepted as a reasonable approxima-
tion of the Canadian urban system, the present and the
desired future of Halifax can be set in a system-wide con-
text in the manner shown in Figure 1.
The second column of Figure 1 is neither a forecast nor
a prediction. Rather, it represents a desired figure, a
target. For present purposes it does not matter how these
numbers are generated. Conceivably they could be an aggre-
gation of 22 local plans, or a set of goals held by some
central agency. This particular set was in fact made up
out of whole cloth by Ross MacKinnon and myself for the
(Contld.) If one thinks of a national pool of potential
migrants, then the growth of particular places will de-
pend heavily on their attractiveness for members of that
pool. Current work at IIASA and the Center for Envi-
ronmental Studies in London (3, 4) is concerned with
elaborating the implied policy consequences for sets of
regions with equal escape frequencies and differential
capture.
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Figure 1: Hypothetical 2001 Population Goals for 22
Canadian Census Metropolitan Areas
CMA
1971 pop.
(OOO' s)
2001 pop.
(OOO' s)
Prio-
rity
Penal-
ty*
Calgary
Chicoutimi-Jonquiere
Edmonton
Hal-iJax
Hamilton
Kitchener-Waterloo
London
Montreal
Ottawa-Hull
Quebec
Regina
St. Catharines
St. John's, Nfld.
St John, N.B.
Saskatoon
Sudbury
Thunder Bay
Toronto
Vancouver
Victoria
iVindsor
Winnipeg
403
134
495
223
498
227
286
2753
603
481
141
303
131
107
126
155
112
2628
1082
106
258
540
650
260
1000
340
580
500
450
4200
900
700
200
380
220
190
210
190
240
4700
1750
400
380
800
6
3
8
9
5
6
5
7
7
7
7
4
8
6
8
2
5
7
9
7
2
7
B
A
B
C
B
B
A
B
B
C
C
B
C
C
C
A
C
B
B
B
A
C
11792 19240
penalty
+
B
.A
••
••••••• __ C
. ---
target
* A: symmetrical
penalty function
B: large penalty for
positive deviation
C: large penalty for
negative deviation
Source: Unpublished work of R.D. MacKinnon and Yu. Evtushenko,
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis,
Laxenburg, Austria
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purpose of running some experiments. The "priority"
column is a likewise fictitious and non-ratio set of judg-
ments about how important it is, all things considered,
that the target figure be achieved, given the type of
penalty function for the case. The last column indicates
that the consequences of missing the target vary for dif-
ferent places. For the large and fast-growing cities,
it is worse to overshoot than undershoot (type B) .
Medium-sized cities with problems of perceived stagnation
have a reversed penalty function, C. For only a few is
the penalty symmetrical.
Recent research at IIASA and the University of Toronto
(5, 15) has focussed on new applications of normative
models for policy evaluation. Beginning with simple Markov
models and going on to .. control theoretic and mathematical
programming approaches, MacKinnon and his colleagues have
in a sense inverted the usual "design-the-optimal-solution"
uses of these methods to explore how difficult or easy it
is, using the system's own dynamics, to arrive at a given
set of goals (or trajectories over time). Numerical
experiments using a non-linear programming algorithm de-
veloped by Yuri Evtushenko are going on in Laxenburg this
week on models of migration processes using these and
analogous data in the specification of objective functions.
Last week, Raman Mehra.derived an elegant analytic solution,
so we now have two operational techniques. Both will be
documented in full in forthcoming IIASA publications.
Suffice to say at this point that Evtushenko's computer
technique is more amenable to complex and highly constrained
situations, while Mehra's recursive equation systems give
the duals directly, thus simplifying sensitivity analysis.
Each run of the 22-variable, 5-period problem in Figure 1
using Evtushenko's approximative method on a PDP 11/45
takes about ten seconds; hence, one of the prime criteria
for research in a policy context, timeliness, can be easily
satisfied.
To recapitulate: feasibility is a continuous dimen-
sion analogous to, but more general than, money cost. At-
taining social goals may be easy, difficult, or in extreme
cases impossible. In this context, "easy" means using the
system's own inherent dynamics to best advantage; "diffi-
cult" means that relatively sweeping controls or rule
changes are needed to change the behaviour of the people
who are the ultimate elements of the system being modelled.
"Impossible" means that no manipulation of the system's
dynamics can produce the desired result. The utility of
the kind of feasibility study advocated here lies in its
corrective feedback on goal formulation or model specifica-
tion. Unlike the large, detailed models which have been
the cause of so much grief in urban studies (l, 14), these
simple aggregative models can give rough but robust esti-
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mates of the feasibility of many different proposals in a
short period of time. They are not optimal models in the
usual engineering or economic sense but rather a
first screen or filter for reasonableness, so that later
detailed analysis can concentrate on alternatives where
there is liable to be some payoff. Were this conference
two weeks from now, I could report some crude numerical
results on the reasonableness of various population
trajectories for Halifax, based on alternative scenarios
of the demographic development of Canada. Interested par-
ties are invited to keep in touch.
Implied Effects
The standard paradigm for good planning insists that,
for proposals taken seriously, a full list of their conse-
quences be set down. Clearly this is meant to include all
effects that can be foreseen, not just those positively
valued by the proponents. Drawing out these lists and
giving some rough quantitative estimate of their magnitude
and incidence calls for an omniscient but dispassionate
systems analyst; the rarity of such creatures is one of
the reasons policy research has not advanced all that far
since the days of the great Florentine father of the pro-
fession. It is here that the dialectical processes of
mutual learning that characterize the best policy debates,
and which constitute the core of a remarkably wise new book
by John Friedmann (7) come into play. I shall not labour
the obvious, but merely list in no particular order (Fig-
ure 2) a non-exhaustive set of things that might well
happen if Halifax followed the growth scenario suggested.
A growth centre strategy means qualitative change,
something more than mere allometric growth, through the
deliberate introduction of activities that would not nor-
mally exist there (or exist in the same magnitudes). Thus
it seems to me that the consequences and side effects we
should be particularly wary about are the ones arising
from discontinuities and points of inflection in social
process. Most of the things in Figure 2 are the standard
items readily predictable by any journeyman econometrician:
lowered age structure, higher service demand, a boom in
housing and other construction, smog and other evidences
of environmental overload. But I have also tried to suggest
a few more subtle and less predictable changes in mood and
values that may well accompany the achievement of the
strategic goals. The more Halifax succeeds in capturing
floaters from the national migrant pool, the more like
other successful cities (Toronto, Calgary, Vancouver) it
would become. The cultural geography of the nation would
be the poorer for the lessened diversity. Many of the
discords that could attend growth, however, would be fo-
cussed on small but highly visible local events. In
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Figure 2: Some possible consequences of a
successful growth center strategy
Halifax population becomes younger, better educated,
better paid, and slightly more female, taking on the
characteristics of the new arrivals and retaining a
few more of the young who would otherwise have gone
to Toronto.
Demand for services rises:
schools, sewers, roads,
galleries, museums, public
transit, and parks are all
found wanting sooner.
Housing prices, a peren-
nial Halifax horror,
start to really climb.
Extensive renewal is
needed. Much of tradi-
tional Halifax disap-
pears or is threatened.
Most of the new jobs are in the service and quaternary
sectors; a few precision manufacturers locate here,
but not many and their multipliers are felt elsewhere.
Wages in the new sectors have to be very high if the
average is to hit the target. A dual economy?
Environmental advantages,
banked on by the growth
strategists to help attract
employment, erode under the
press of new bodies. Out-
raged local groups join
others in Victoria and
Toronto demanding an end
to growth.
Old families lose their
social hegemony.
Citadel Hill, an insig-
nificant mound in a
forest of high-rises, is
rarely seen through the
smog anyway.
"Neighbourhood" and other
expressions of territori-
al community disappear in
favour of class- and
interest-based "communi-
ties without ｰ ｲ ｯ ｰ ｩ ｮ ｱ ｵ ｩ ｴ ｹ ｾ
Halifax finds itself higher on the hierarchy of inno-
vation diffusion, with all the emphasis on fast pace,
fashion, trendiness and trivia that goes with it.
Rumours now start here, instead of winding up here.
Size and wealth, and changing tastes, bring new arts
centers, various bohemians, exotic restaurants whose
quality sometimes matches their prices.
There are growing problems
of drug use, street crime,
and teenage anomie.
In 1997, the Mayor calls
Halifax "the San Francis-
co of the Atlantic" with
a perfectly straight face
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housing, for example, one could expect the sort of slum
whitewashing that has rehabilitated many old neighbour-
hoods elsewhere, over the protests of the poor who get
priced out of their own market. In Trefann Court and
other areas of Toronto, in Washington's Georgetown and
Chicago's Old Town, in the Kitsilano section of Vancouver,
the process has made money for middle-class entrepreneurs
at the expense of the resident poor. Insofar as growth
encourages the spreading of the income range, the public
finance burdens of relieving the losers will tend to grow
much faster than the average rate of regional economic ex-
pansion. But of course there would be a larger well fran which
the necessary revenues could be drawn. And so it goes.
Valuation: problems of equity
The fundamental political problem is of course not
the aggregate effects of a policy change but their redis-
tributional incidence: who gets, and who pays? If costs
and benefits are generalized from dollars to utility, then
decision theory tells us that, having exhaustively and in
a perfectly unbiased fashion described all the effects of
the proposed action -- Figure 2 is but a parody when set
against such a standard -- all the interested groups who
will be party to the decision should attach value judg-
ments to each and every outcome, jointly where necessary.
Nor is the final choice merely an easy summation, for
there are of course substantial problems of weighting,
uncertainty over outcomes, discounting rules, and criteria
for equity. Since the attributes of the outcomes are only
imperfectly known, and possibly dependent on nature and
sequence of moves in the decision process itself, employ-
ment is guaranteed for a long time for game theorists and
decision analysts. At bottom, though, the vast and power-
ful literature of decision theory offers no clear guide-
lines about two crucial problems: deciding whose values
ought to get applied, and dealing with intertemporal trade-
offs where a monetary numeraire is not appropriate.* The
fact that these ethical questions are trans-scientific
is no help to a community and its harassed planners and
politicians.
To illustrate, ask whether in the case of deciding
upon a particular future..for the Halifax region, there
* The elegant prescriptions of mathematical economics for
optimal growth with or without exhaustible resources deal
only with situations where all values can be expressed
monetarily (cf.13). No such cool calculus is possible
where the valuta-rnclude human lives, the extinction of
biological species, and other irreversible events.
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would be unvoiced interests. Assuming that democracy is
alive and well in Halifax, and that senior governments
would hardly act without the warm encouragement of the
local governments, there is at least a mechanism through
which every concerned Haligonian can assert his interests.
But there are at least three classes of concerned
people who do not have a realistic possibility of parti-
cipating.
First, there are the rural and small-town Maritimers '
so airily dismissed above. Insofar as a growth strategy
focussing on Halifax pre-empted possibilities for beneficial
change in their own communities, they would be worse off.
Niles Hansen (9) has already indicated that the evidence
for the tricklIng down of employment benefits is less than
overwhelming, unless people live within commuting range of
the growth centre. As with urban housing, owners of real
estate may reap speculative gains, in this case by selling
scenic shorelines or fine old farmhouses to the newly weal-
thy weekenders from Halifax at ever more inflated prices.
Effects on this group of people will in the aggregate be
mixed, subtle, but hardly negligeable in total. ｓ ｩ ｮ ｣ ｾ it
is hard to conceive of organized political pressure from
from these' largely inchoate interests being brought to bear
on the provincial government(s), their voice in the decision
may be weaker than the straight merits, or magnitude of
impact, might indicate.
That is even more true for the second group of in-
terested but absent parties: the u.s. tourists and other
Canadians -- ex-Maritimers, many of them, with fond memo-
ries and ties of emotion to half-idealized landscapes of a
generation before -- who value the uniqueness of Halifax
among the increasingly homogenized urban cultures of North
America. Moreover, even though these people may never
visit Halifax, they derive satisfaction from its mere
existence. In other words, somewhere "out there" is a
very large number of people, each of whom feels mildly that
it would be nice if Halifax retained as much of its his-
toric and cultural identity as possible. The aggregate
weight of feeling in that population may be truly large,
but since mild nostalgia is never a base for a political
movement, these sentiments are unlikely to affect the
course of events very much.
For the spatially separated there remains at least a
theoretical possibility for direct involvement through
established political mechanisms. This is hardly the case
for the temporally separated, those future residents, mi-
grants and local products alike, whose quality of life may
be much affected by decisions taken now. Note that pre-
dicting the valuations that this potential interest group
might place on present choices can be no more than idle.
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Figure 3: Hypothetical
Consumption Streams
Resilience
A
B
C
T
Rather, the general choice
is between consumption now
and consumption later. But
the standard rules (13)
break down when the time
periods are longer than the
half-lives of human beings.
From whose point of view is
the curve A in Figure 3
optimal, if tl-to>lOO years
and the area under all
curves is equal?
It is due to the inevitability of conundrums like
these that we are trying to give operational relevance in
urban affairs to the concept of resilience, as developed
by ecologists to guide the management of living systems.
C.S. Holling and his colleagues, inspired by stability
theory in mathematics and by some empirical singularities
in nature, has argued that resource managers should be
more concerned with the domain of stability of the system
in question than with maintaining an artificially stable
optimal equilibrium. Most human interventions in ecosys-
tems have only small effect on the loci of equilibria, but
large ones on the boundaries of the stability domain, thus
increasing the probability that stochastic processes may
suddenly flip the system into wholly new, unpredictable,
and possibly disastrous stable behaviours Ｌ Ｈ ｾ Ｌ 10).
This pioneering work has actually been applied in
the control of the New Brunswick spruce budworm (e.g., 11)
and studies of the North Pacific salmon are underway.
So far, however, it remains but a richly suggestive analogy
in the more complicated field of urban studies. Following
the lead of the biologists (12), some work is going on to
develop new areas of non-classical mathematics in order to
have a more natural modelling language for processes
characterized by singularities, divergences, cyclical be-
haviour, and the like (e.g., 2), but much remains to be
done. In terms of policy recommendations in actual cases,
only subjective and intuitive interpretations can be
hazarded at this point (18). In summary, and with the
development policy of Halifax in mind, these would be as
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follows:
(1) In the face of the inevitably unexpected shocks
from the turbulent environment, design policies so
that the equally unavoidable system failures are non-
catastrophic: safe failure rather than fail-safe.
This means diversity, autonomy, and dis-integration:
the technology of the small, wherever possible. It
means letting a hundred experimental flowers bloom
-- and having the institutional capacity to learn
from them: a learning, monitoring mechanism, with
the competence and independence to report the blun-
ders as well as the successes.
(2) Plans should stress resilience and robustness,
even at the expense of efficiency or cost-effective-
ness in any narrow sense. This is especially true
·for long-range strategies.
(3) Invent new ways of modelling urban processes
which are simple, transparent to the non-expert,
and which give quick-and-dirty estimates of policy
impact across many attributes (instead of spurious
three-digit accuracy on a few); embed them in an
open, freewheeling, but cumulating and learning,
process of public participation in valuation. By
the same token beware of systems analysts proposing
large models; they are disturbingly and unrealis-
tically rational.
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